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Abstract
We explore how optimal information choices change the predictions of strategic models.
When a large number of agents play a game with strategic complementarity, information choices
exhibit complementarity as well: If an agent wants to do what others do, they want to know
what others know. This makes heterogeneous beliefs difficult to sustain and may generate mul-
tiple equilibria. In models with substitutability, agents prefer to differentiate their information
choices. We use these theoretical results to examine the role of information choice in recent
price-setting models and to propose modeling techniques that ensure equilibrium uniqueness.
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Recent work in many fields, including nominal price adjustment, asset pricing, financial crises,
political economy or competition in networks, shows that equilibrium outcomes, welfare and deter-
minacy all depend on what information agents can observe.1 In most of these models, the infor-
mation that agents are endowed with is exogenous. It usually represents a guess by the economist
about what information is available. In practice, the information people observe depends both on
its availability and on their choice of what to learn.
We ask what agents choose to observe when information is costly, and how these information
choices change the equilibrium outcomes. Comparing games with and without information acqui-
sition, we highlight one similarity and one difference. Our main result focuses on the similarity:
When agents choose how much information to acquire before choosing strategic actions, the in-
formation choice inherits the same strategic motives as the actions. Agents who want to do what
others do want to know what others know. Decision complementarities in the underlying game
produce coordination motives in information acquisition. The converse is also true. Agents who
want to do what others do not, want information others do not know. The difference is that
complementarity in information acquisition can cause the number of equilibria to change. Adding
information choice can resurrect multiple equilibria, even if the exogenous information model has
one equilibrium. Whether the equilibrium is unique depends on the public or private nature of the
information agents can acquire.
To explore strategic settings, we use a version of Morris and Shin’s (2002) static ‘beauty contest’
game (section 1). In a beauty contest, agents’ payoffs depend on how closely their action matches
an unknown target that depends on an exogenous state and other agents’ actions. This game has
been used to describe many strategic settings with incomplete information, including: financial
markets, investment decisions, or price adjustment with monopolistic competition. We add an
initial stage, in which agents can improve the quality of their information, at a cost.
It is well-known that common information helps agents to coordinate. Our main result goes
beyond this existing intuition in two ways. First, when actions are complements, information
1Among many other papers, see Mankiw and Reis (2002), Woodford (2002), Lorenzoni (2006) or Zeira (1999) for
models of price adjustment and business cycles. See Veronesi (1999), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992),
Caplin and Leahy (1994), Morris and Shin (1998), Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), Angeletos and Werning (2006), or
Hellwig, Mukherji, and Tsyvinski (2005) for models of financial crises. See Farrell and Klemperer (2007), Stromberg
(2001), or Edmond (2005) for models of network competition and political economy.
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acquisition is complementary, even if that information is a private signal, conditionally independent
from all other signals. Second, one might think that agents whose actions are substitutes would still
want to know what others know, to better take the opposite action. This is not the case; agents
want to know what others do not. Section 1.2 shows that the strategic motives in information
acquisition come from the effects that others’ information choices have on the covariance between
the unobserved state and the aggregate action. When others are well-informed, aggregate actions
covary highly with the state. If actions are complements, this covariance makes learning about
the true state even more valuable because it reveals information about others’ actions. But when
actions are substitutes, the aggregate actions and the state have offsetting effects on a firm’s optimal
decision: Knowing the value of the state is high encourages a high action, while knowing that others
will choose high actions encourages a low action. Thus, the optimal action varies less across states,
when others are informed. If the state matters less for decisions, knowing the state becomes less
valuable. In short, information loses value when other firms observe it.
Section 1.3 shows that complementarity in actions, combined with investment in potentially
public information, is a new source of multiple equilibria: If an agent purchases one more bit
of potentially common information than any other agent, this bit remains private, and its value
is the marginal value of private information. But if the agent considers not purchasing a bit of
information that is observed by all others, its value is the marginal value of public information.
This discontinuity in marginal value arises because potentially public information only has the
value of public information when others choose to observe it. The result is that when actions
are complementary, agents want to observe additional information, only if others do so as well.
Equilibrium public information choice is indeterminate, even though the same model, with any of
the feasible information choices exogenously imposed, would have a unique equilibrium.
For applied theorists who want to formulate a model with coordination motives and information
choice and who want a unique prediction from that model, the solution lies in private information.
When agents invest only in conditionally independent, private signals, complementarity is weak.
The result is a unique equilibrium. While endowing agents with heterogeneous information guaran-
tees an unique equilibrium in Morris and Shin (2002), the game with information choice imposes an
additional requirement for equilibrium uniqueness: The information agents choose to acquire must
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also be private. Unfortunately, a small amount of private noise added to agents’ chosen signals will
not suffice. For the equilibrium to be unique, signal noise across agents must be independent. But
such an independence assumption should be well-founded because it is stringent and it ultimately
determines the model’s predictions.
Section 2 uses the theoretical results from the preceding section to critically examine recent
price-setting models with information choice. Woodford (2002) and Mankiw and Reis (2002) add
exogenous information heterogeneity and price-setting complementarity to get bigger real effects
from a demand shock in a setting like that of Lucas (1972). Sims (2003), Moscarini (2004) and Reis
(2006) model information choice, but neglect its strategic nature. Following Reis (2006), we analyze
monopolistically competitive firms who adjust prices every period, but update their information
infrequently. In each period, firms choose whether or not to pay a cost to“plan.” A firm that plans
observes all shocks and prices realized since it last planned.
Because competitive monopolists have a coordination motive when setting prices, they also have
a coordination motive in choosing when to plan. Planning complementarity changes the predictions
of the exogenous information and non-strategic learning models. Firms acquire less information
about demand because other firms are imperfectly informed. When all firms know less about
demand, average prices covary less with it. This price-demand covariance is the inverse of price
stickiness. Thus planning complementarity plays an important role in generating a realistic amount
of price stickiness, which is what the price-setting models are designed to explain.
Complementarity is both a blessing and a curse. Planning complementarity creates two prob-
lems that follow from the two main results we establish in section 1. First, because firms choose a
date at which to plan, they may synchronize their information acquisition by planning all on the
same date. This result is the dynamic analog to the static result that all firms want to observe
the same signals. Synchronized planning fundamentally alters the price response to a monetary
shock. Instead of the gradual price adjustment predicted by the non-strategic models, synchronized-
planning prices do not react at all, until they jump from the burst of new information. Second,
multiple equilibria can arise because of the public nature of price-relevant information (section 2.3).
Multiplicity makes the rate of price adjustment, crucial for monetary policy analysis, indetermi-
nate. Section 2.4 offers a solution; requiring the information price-setters acquire to be private
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can deliver a unique equilibrium. One micro-founded theory that justifies such an assumption is
rational inattention (Sims 2003). Agents with limited channel capacity always observe signals that
are the true state, plus independent noise.
These results provide a way to evaluate information assumptions made in a variety of strategic
settings. In settings with substitutability, such as financial investment, agents have a strong incen-
tive to differentiate their information. Markets with common knowledge, usually studied in finance,
are unlikely to arise. In models with complementarities, such as monopolistic price-setting, agents
want to acquire the same information. Heterogeneous beliefs are difficult to sustain endogenously.
In price-setting models, this effect creates the paradox that the pricing complementarity needed to
slow down price adjustment also makes differences in information and a gradual adjustment of the
aggregate price level difficult to sustain.
1 A Beauty Contest Model with Information Choice
We convey our main intuition using a beauty contest game (as in Morris and Shin (2002)). Agents
are rewarded for taking actions close to two values: the value of the true state and the average
action of other agents.2 Agents choose how precise a signal to purchase about the true state, before
they play this game. When other firms are poorly informed, signals reveal mostly just information
about the state. When others are well-informed, signals are informative about aggregate actions
as well. The results also illustrate how information choices can affect macroeconomic outcomes.
When agents learn more, aggregate actions become more volatile, and more correlated with the
true state. By quadratically approximating objectives, we can map many models into this linear-
quadratic framework. Section 2 is an example of such an approximation.
1.1 Model description
In stage one, nature draws the state variable s and a series of signals about s. Agents choose which
of these signals to observe. In stage two, agents observe their chosen signals and pick an optimal
2Other variants of the beauty contest game have been used by Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006) to study asset pricing,
by Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1992) to study the incentives of financial analysts, and by Angeletos and Pavan
(2007a), Hellwig (2006) and Cornand and Heinemann (2007) to study the welfare effects of information provision.
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action. Agents choose actions simultaneously. We’ll call this action, setting the price p. The results
generalize to a range of strategic actions in a quadratic loss setting.
A measure one continuum of agents, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] choose a price pi ∈ R to minimize
the squared distance between their price and an unknown target price p∗. The target price has a
component that depends on an unknown state s and a component that depends on the aggregate
price: p¯ =
∫
pidi:
u (pi, p¯, s) = − 1
(1− r)2 (pi − p
∗)2 where p∗ = (1− r) s+ rp¯. (1)
If s is common knowledge, the best response is pi = (1− r) s+ rp¯, and pi = p¯ = s constitutes the
unique equilibrium. The coefficient r < 1 measures the complementarity/substitutability of agents’
decisions. If r > 0, decisions are complementary: Best responses are increasing in the prices set by
other agents. if r < 0, decisions are strategic substitutes. A higher r means more complementarity.
The normalization by (1− r)2 is for pure notational convenience. We will use lower-case variables
in regular type face for scalars, boldface lower-case for vectors, and capital letters for matrices.
Information choices Nature selects a state s ∼ N (0, 1). In addition, nature selects a k × 1
vector of common signal noises u ∼ N (0, Ik), which are independent of the state s. Finally, for
each agent, nature selects an l× 1 vector of idiosyncratic signal noises vi, which are independently
and identically distributed across agents, with distribution vi ∼ N (0, Il), and are independent of
s and u.
These shocks generate an n× 1 vector of potentially observable signals zi:
zi = 1n·s+Au+Bvi
1n is an n× 1 vector of ones and A and B are arbitrary (n× k) and (n× l) matrices of coefficients.
The matrix [A B] has row rank n, so that no subset of signals in zi can fully reveal s.
This formulation imposes as little restriction as necessary on the possible information structure.
In particular, by setting either A or B equal to zero, we can allow for special cases where all signals
are either purely private, i.e. with noise independent across agents, or common. We also allow for
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an arbitrary structure of correlation across agents and/or signals.
Agents choose to observe a subset of the signal vector zi. Formally, their information choice
consists of a vector χi comprised of zeros and ones, such that χij = 1 means that agent i observes
the jth entry of zi. The information choice χi comes from a compact feasible set Υ ⊆ {0, 1}n. The
agent’s cost of information is determined by a function C (χ), which is increasing in χ. For each
χ, we construct a corresponding m× n matrix X of zeros and ones. The number of rows m is the
number of ones in χ. If the jth entry of χ is 1, then there is a row of X that is all zeros, except
for a one in the jth position. When setting prices, the agent’s information set Ii consists of his
information choice χi and the vector of signals he observes Xzi.
Equilibrium A Bayesian Nash Equilibrium is defined as a probability distribution µ over the
feasible set of information choices Υ, and a decision rule p
(Ii), such that: (i) given the distribution
µ, the decision rule p
(Ii) solves p (Ii) = (1− r)Ei (s)+rEi (p¯), and (ii) the distribution µ assigns
positive measure only to argmaxχ∈Υ
(
E0
[
u
(
p
(Ii) , p¯, s)]− C (χ)).
Agents update their beliefs about the state, using these observed signals, according to Bayes’
Law. E0 (·) denotes agents’ expectations prior to observing any signals, while Ei (·) denotes an
agent’s posterior expectations, conditional on Ii.
We focus on symmetric Nash equilibria, in which all agents follow the same (possibly mixed)
strategy in stage one. Agents’ information decisions will turn out to depend only on second moments
of the distributions of s and p¯. Since these second moments are not affected by signal realizations,
and are common knowledge in the model, information strategies will be common knowledge as well.
Ranking information choices When signals with different amounts of public and private infor-
mation are available, it is not obvious which signal sets are more informative than others. Therefore,
we define rankings of individual and aggregate information choices. The results use the following
two definitions to describe how an agent’s information choice changes when there is “more infor-
mation acquisition”.
Definition 1 For any χ, χ′ ∈ Υ, χ is at least as informative as χ′, if and only if χ − χ′ ≥ 0,
entry-by-entry.
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Definition 2 For any µ, µ′ ∈ ∆(Υ), the information choice distribution µ generates more aggre-
gate information acquisition than µ′, if and only if µ first-order stochastically dominates µ′.
Thus, information choice χ is at least as informative as χ′, if every signal that an agent observes
under χ′ is also observed under χ. The second definition naturally extends this ranking of individual
information choices to aggregate distributions over information choices.
1.2 Results: the value of information
Expectations and actions in stage 2 are conditioned on the agent’s information sets. Agent i’s
information set includes the prior distribution of s (common knowledge), the stage 1 information
choice, and the realization of the acquired signals. We can solve the model by backwards induction:
For any given distribution of information choices µ, we characterize equilibrium strategies in stage
2, and use this to determine expected payoffs in stage 1. The results link the strategic motives in
information acquisition to the strategic motives in actions.
1.2.1 Bayesian Updating
We begin by computing posterior beliefs, conditional on an information choice and signal realiza-
tions. We define a k + 1× 1 vector of variables ω =
[
s u′
]′
. This is the relevant state variable
because agents want to forecast the true state s and the average action, which depends on common
signal noise u. The state ω, and signals Xzi are jointly normally distributed. Thus, conditional on
observing Ii, ω is normally distributed with posterior mean and variance-covariance matrix
E
(
ω|Ii) = Cov(ω,Xzi)′ V ar(Xzi)−1 Xzi (2)
Σ (χ) := V ar(ω|Ii) = V ar(ω)− Cov(ω,Xzi)′ V ar(Xzi)−1 Cov(ω,Xzi). (3)
This follows from standard formulas for the conditional distribution of normal variables. Appendix
A derives these conditional moments and shows that V ar(ω) = Ik+1, V ar(Xzi) = XΓΓ′X ′, where
Γ =
[
1n A B
]
, and Cov(ω,Xzi) = [1m, XA].
For any probability distribution µ ∈ ∆(Υ) of the information choices made by all agents in the
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economy, we also define the average posterior variance-covariance matrix of ω: Σ¯ (µ) =
∫
Σ(χ) dµ,
where integration is done entry-by-entry. This is a measure of the average level of uncertainty
agents are facing.
The next lemma relates our ranking of information choices to the posterior variance-covariance
matrices Σ and Σ¯. The proofs of this and all further results are in appendix A.
Lemma 1 (i) For any χ,χ′ ∈ Υ, if information choice χ is more informative than χ′, then Σ(χ′)−
Σ(χ) is positive semi-definite.
(ii) For any µ, µ′ ∈ ∆(Υ), if µ generates more aggregate information acquisition than µ′, then
Σ¯ (µ′)− Σ¯ (µ) is positive semi-definite.
If χ is more informative than χ′, the posterior beliefs about ω conditioned on χ have lower
variance than those conditioned on χ′. Since Σ (χ) corresponds to the mean squared forecast error,
a more informative choice therefore leads to more accurate forecasts on average and to higher
expected utility. Likewise, if a probability distribution µ ∈ ∆(Υ) of the information choices made
by all agents leads to more aggregate information acquisition than an alternative distribution µ′,
then the average posterior beliefs are on average more accurate under µ, than under µ′. This result
is useful because Σ (χ) and Σ¯ (µ) will show up in expected utility. The result tells us that these
two terms are sufficient to capture the effects of individual and aggregate information acquisition.
The converse of lemma 1 only holds in special cases (for example, when all signals are inde-
pendent of each other, but positively correlated across agents). In general it is possible for some
information choice χ to generate a smaller variance-covariance matrix than χ′, even though some
signals are observed under χ′ that are not observed under χ.
1.2.2 Optimal pricing strategies
Solving by backwards induction means that we first solve the equilibrium in the price-setting game
conditional on a given distribution of information choices, before solving the information choice
problem. We conjecture that the following is the equilibrium price function and then verify that
conjecture by showing that it satisfies the first-order condition. A separate technical appendix on
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the authors’ websites shows that this equilibrium is unique.3
p
(Ii) = (1− r)b′ ∞∑
k=0
rkEi
(
E¯(k) (ω)
)
(4)
where b′ = [ 1 0 . . . 0 ], and the average expectations operator is E¯(k) (·) = E¯E¯(k−1) (·), such that
E¯(0) (ω) = ω, and E¯ (ω) =
∫
Ei (ω) di. Averaging (2) across all i and using the fact that the vi’s
have mean zero reveals that the average expectation of ω is E¯ (ω) =
[
I − Σ¯ (µ)]ω. Iterating on
this equation tells us that E¯(k) (ω) =
[
I − Σ¯ (µ)]k ω. After substituting this expression into (4) and
taking the limit of the infinite sum, the optimal pricing rule is
p
(Ii) = (1− r)b′ [(1− r)I + rΣ¯(µ)]−1Ei (ω) (5)
where Ei (ω) is given by (2).4 Averaging (5) and substituting in the formula for E¯ (ω) yields the
average price p¯ = (1− r)b′ [(1− r)I + rΣ¯(µ)]−1 (I − Σ¯(µ))ω. The resulting target price is p∗ =
(1− r)b′ [(1− r)I + rΣ¯(µ)]−1 ω. Substituting p(Ii), and p∗ into (1) and taking an expectation
delivers expected utility:
EU(χ, µ) ≡ Ei (u (pi, p¯, s)) = −b′
[
(1− r)I + rΣ¯(µ)]−1Σ(χ) [(1− r)I + rΣ¯(µ)]−1 b (6)
A linear function of more posterior variance Σ decreases utility. In other words, more uncertainty
makes agents less happy.
1.2.3 Strategic incentives in information choice
Our main result is that with decision complementarities, the value of information increases as there
is more information acquisition; the opposite is true when decisions are strategic substitutes.
3See appendix A for derivations of the expressions that follow. The argument that (4) is the unique equilibrium
originally appeared in Morris and Shin (2002). However, Dewan and Myatt (2007) and Angeletos and Pavan (2007a)
pointed out gaps in their original proof, and Angeletos and Pavan (2007b) propose an alternative proof for uniqueness.
The separate appendix simplifies and adapts their argument to our model.
4Strictly speaking, equation (4) is well-defined only if r ∈ (−1, 1). Equation (6), however remains well-defined for
r ≤ −1, and continues to constitute a solution to the agent’s optimality condition, and hence an equilibrium.
9
Proposition 1 Main Result: Suppose that χ is more informative than χ′, and µ leads to more
information acquisition than µ′. Then
If there is no strategic interaction (r = 0), the value of additional information is independent
of the other agents’ information choices: EU (χ, µ)− EU (χ′, µ) = EU (χ, µ′)−EU (χ′, µ′).
If decisions are complementary (r > 0), the value of additional information is increasing in the
information acquisition of other agents: EU (χ, µ)− EU (χ′, µ) > EU (χ, µ′)−EU (χ′, µ′).
If decisions are substitutes (r < 0), the value of additional information is decreasing in the
information acquisition of other agents: EU (χ, µ)− EU (χ′, µ) < EU (χ, µ′)−EU (χ′, µ′).
When r > 0, acquiring information is a complement, regardless of whether it is public or private
information. One might have imagined that complementarity only raises the value of public infor-
mation. However, even when agents invest in private signals, more investment in information leads
to a stronger covariance of prices with fundamentals, which in turn raises the value of information,
if and only if decisions are complementary.
Thus the reason for the strategic motives in information acquisition comes from the covariance
of the average prices with the state. As more agents become informed, their beliefs are closer to the
truth and their prices are more reflective of the true state. For all r < 1, the covariance of prices
with the state is decreasing in Σ¯ and thus increasing in the amount of aggregate information:
cov(p¯, s|χ) = (1− r)b′[(I − Σ¯(µ))−1 − rI]−1Σ(χ)b. (7)
When prices are complements (r ∈ (0, 1)), each firm’s target price p∗ = (1 − r)s + rp¯ puts
positive weight on the state and the average price. When aggregate information (Σ¯) increases, the
higher covariance of prices and the state makes the variance of p∗ rise: var(p∗) = (1− r)2var(s) +
r2var(p¯) + 2r(1− r)cov(p¯, s). A more variable target price is a more uncertain target price. More
uncertainty makes information more valuable. Conversely, when prices are strategic substitutes,
the state and the average sign enter in the target price with opposite signs. Since r(1−r) < 0, more
covariance reduces the target price variance. This lowers the value of information. In summary,
more aggregate information acquisition amplifies the agents’ uncertainty about the target price
when prices are complements and reduces uncertainty when prices are substitutes. This is why in
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the strategic motives in information acquisition mirror the strategic motives in price-setting.
This general theory of information acquisition underlies well-known results in other fields. For
example, in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), investment is a strategic substitute: Investors prefer
purchasing assets that others don’t want, because these assets have low prices. Similarly, actions are
also substitutes in Cournot markets (Vives 1988) and winner-take-all forecasting contests (Ottaviani
and Sorensen 2006). Each paper finds that information is a strategic substitute as well: the more
information other agents purchase, the lower its value. Chamley (2006), Bullard, Evans, and
Honkapohja (2007) and Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1992) construct a ‘beauty contest’ asset
market, where investment is a strategic complement. They find that investors want to learn what
other investors know. Our results explain why these results differ and how they can be extended
to a broader class of settings: arbitrary combinations of public and private information, within a
linear-quadratic model.
1.3 Multiple Equilibria
Adding information choice to games with strategic complementarity raises a new problem - multiple
equilibria reappear in settings where the price-setting equilibrium would be unique. Two features
of the information choice sets can produce multiple equilibria: discreteness and the choice over
public or correlated information. This section shows that when either is present, multiple equilibria
emerge.
1.3.1 Discreteness in Information Choice
Discreteness in information choice coupled with complementarity creates multiple equilibria. This
result is not surprising because the same logic applies in games with discrete actions. We briefly
present the result because it contrasts with the multiple equilibria generated by public information
in the next section.
Agents decide whether to observe more or less information. Their choice set Υ contains χ and
a less informative, less costly choice χ′. This is equivalent to endowing every agent with the signals
corresponding to the positive entries of the vector χ′, and allowing them to purchase at a cost
C > 0 the additional signals corresponding to the positive entries of the vector χ− χ′.
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If r ∈ (0, 1), there exist multiple equilibria. Let µ ∈ [0, 1] denote the fraction of agents observing
χ. µ = 0 is an equilibrium if EU (χ, 0) − EU (χ′, 0) ≤ C, while µ = 1 is an equilibrium if
EU (χ, 1)−EU (χ′, 1) ≥ C. Proposition 1 says that this difference in marginal utilities is increasing
in µ if and only if r > 0. Thus, when r > 0, there is a set of information costs C that satisfy both
conditions and therefore generate multiple equilibria (µ = 0, µ = 1 and a symmetric mixed strategy
equilibrium), only when prices are complements. If instead prices are substitutes, proposition 1
tells us that the value of additional information is monotonically decreasing in µ. Therefore, for
each cost C there exists either a pure strategy equilibrium (µ = 0 or 1) or a unique mixed strategy
equilibrium µ ∈ (0, 1) such that EU (χ, µ)−EU (χ′, µ) = C.
1.3.2 A model of near-continuous information choice
To examine the effects of public or correlated signals, we consider the following special case of our
model. Let k = l = n, A = γδ−1/2In and B =
√
1− γ2δ−1/2In. This means that for a given
agent, all signals are independent of each other; across agents, each signal contains a common
noise component and a private noise component. The overall precision of any signal is δ and the
correlation in the signal noise between any two agents is γ2. We further suppose that the cost of
acquiring any m signals is C (mδ), where C (·) is differentiable, increasing and convex. We focus
on the limiting case when δ → 0 and n → ∞, so that the total number of signals becomes large,
but the information content of any given signal vanishingly small.
This formulation embeds as special cases the case where all signals are potentially common
(γ = 1), when signals are purely private (γ = 0) and any intermediate correlation.
Proposition 2 When information is near-continuous (δ → 0), an information choice χ is sus-
tainable as a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium, if and only if the total signal precision φ = δχ′χ
satisfies
1
(1− rγ2 + (1− r)φ)2 ≥ C
′ (φ) ≥
(
1− rγ2)2
(1− rγ2 + (1− r)φ)2 .
On the left side of the inequality is the marginal value of the last signal acquired, which is
observed by all other agents. On the rights side is the marginal value of the next signal, which is
not observed by others. If the marginal value of information is continuous, the left and right sides
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of the inequality are equal. This means that there is only one equilibrium C ′(φ) and thus a unique
equilibrium level of signal precision. If the marginal value of information is discontinuous and there
is an interval where the marginal value of private information is below the marginal cost, but the
marginal value of public information is above it, multiple equilibria arise: It is optimal to acquire
another bit of information if others do so as well.
Multiple equilibria arise in two ways: in the choice of which signals to observe and in the
precision of the information acquired. The proposition bounds signal precision only. But many
combinations of signals deliver the same precision. When information is private, every set of signals
generates identical covariances with all aggregate variables, so this multiplicity is inconsequential.
But when information is public or correlated, agents may decide to learn about variable a, in which
case p will be correlated with a. Or they could learn about b, in which case p will be correlated
with b. If a and b are macro aggregates, the information choice will determine their covariance with
average actions. Multiple equilibria in signal precision is the topic we turn to next.
Multiple public/correlated information equilibria In price-setting games without informa-
tion choice, endowing agents with heterogeneous information and eliminating discreteness in their
choice sets is enough to guarantee unique outcomes. But when agents can choose to observe infor-
mation that is potentially public or observe signals with correlated signal noise, multiple equilibria
re-emerge. The existence of multiple equilibria follows directly from proposition 2. When informa-
tion is public or correlated (γ ∈ (0, 1]), the left and right sides of the inequality differ by the factor
1/(1 − rγ2)2. When r > 0, 1 > (1− rγ2)2 and the left side is greater than the right. This means
that there is a set of signal precisions φ, whose cost is in the interval between the left and right
side values, each of which is sustainable as an equilibrium.
One example of potentially public information is a newspaper. Imagine that each agent gets
the same newspaper and chooses which pages of that paper to read. An additional page of the
newspaper is only public information if other agents choose to read it. When r > 0, public and
private information have different marginal values; the marginal value of an additional page is
discretely higher when that page is read by all other agents. This discontinuity creates multiple
equilibria.
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Furthermore, unlike in Morris and Shin (1998), adding some information heterogeneity to agents’
prior beliefs or to their signals will not unravel multiple equilibria. If firms observe signals with
(imperfectly) correlated errors, then when they set the wrong prices, those prices will at least be
similar and firms will benefit from being coordinated. Therefore, the marginal value of signals that
are correlated with the ones others observe is strictly higher than the marginal value of additional
information. The lower the correlation, the smaller the drop in the marginal value of extra signals
that others do not observe, and the smaller the set of multiple equilibria (see figure 1). As a practical
matter, a small degree of correlation is not very problematic because all of the information choices
in the equilibrium set have almost identical precisions. The Morris and Shin (1998) refinement does
not apply because signal heterogeneity affects beliefs about the level of s and p¯. But information
demand depends only on the variance and covariance of s and p¯, which are common knowledge.
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Figure 1: Choosing correlated information produces multiple equilibria. As the degree of correlation
falls, the equilibrium set shrinks.
When prices are substitutes r < 0, there is no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium in informa-
tion acquisition: When r < 0, no φz will satisfy the proposition’s inequality. The discontinuity in
the marginal value of information still generates a non-convexity. This non-convexity gives agents
an incentive to invest in bits of information that other agents have not invested in. This is the same
force that causes identical investors to acquire different information and thus hold different assets
in Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2007). The result also explains why information sharing is
never optimal among Cournot competitors whose goods are substitutes, but is optimal for Bertrand
competitors whose prices are complements (Vives 1984, 1988).
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Equilibrium Uniqueness: Choosing Private Signals Even in models with complementarity
and information choice, multiple equilibria can be avoided. When agents choose the precision
of private information, the equilibrium is unique. To see this result for symmetric pure-strategy
equilibria, note that if γ = 0 in proposition 2, then the left and right sides of the inequality are
equal. This pins down a unique value for the marginal cost of information C ′ (φ). Since the cost
function is assumed to be convex, there is a one-to-one mapping between marginal costs and number
of signals. While proposition 2 suggests uniqueness of a pure strategy equilibrium, appendix A.5
generalizes this result by ruling out mixed or asymmetric equilibria.
One example of this type of information is the research of market analysts. Image an analyst
choosing how large a research department to form. One research department’s findings are uncor-
related with other departments’ because researchers each discover independent signals about the
truth. But with more researchers, the department’s information will be more precise. Regardless of
whether prices are complements or substitutes, when agents choose the precision of such a private
signal from a continuous interval of potential precisions, there is a unique equilibrium.
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Figure 2: Public information choice (panels 1-2) produces multiple equilibria. The private infor-
mation equilibrium (panel 3) is unique. In all three cases, prices are complements (r > 0). But the
price-setting game alone would have a unique equilibrium.
Figure 2 illustrates how the private information choice model, where the marginal value of
information is continuous, differs from the public information choice model where the marginal
value of information falls discretely once an agent has observed more information than others
have. Taken together, these results tell us that multiplicity is a robust phenomenon when agents
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play a coordination game with information choice. Simply adding private noise will not overturn
the results. While restricting agents to choose information from menus of private signals with
independent errors does guarantee uniqueness, it is a strong restriction.
2 Dynamic Information Choice in Price-Setting Models
While section 1 was about establishing our main results and showing why they were true, this
section argues that our results are of practical relevance in price-setting models. Complementarity
in price-setting creates complementarity in information acquisition, which helps create price rigidity.
But the combination of complementarity and potentially public information also creates multiple
equilibria. While our previous results tell us that uniqueness can be restored with private signals,
section 2.4 details two ways this solution can be incorporated in models of price-setting.
Our results contribute to a long-standing debate in the dynamic price-setting literature (Ball
and Romer 1989): Should firms who adjust prices infrequently synchronize or stagger their price-
setting? Only staggered price setting delivers the gradual response of aggregate price to monetary
shocks observed in the data. Yet, the coordination motive in price-setting that many models employ
to slow price adjustment also creates incentives to synchronize price-setting. A new generation of
models, starting with Mankiw and Reis (2002), use information acquisition to slow price adjustment
but ignore the strategic nature of information choice. By considering strategic information choice,
we show that the coordination motive re-emerges, and with it, synchronized information acquisition.
Of course, there are mechanisms that can sustain staggered price setting equilibria (Bhaskar 2002).
Costly information models could use the same mechanisms to ensure staggered planning. But
information choice, by itself, does not avoid the strategic problems that arise in standard price-
setting models.
The model, based on Reis (2006), is a dynamic version of the section 1 model. It builds on
standard New Keynesian models. In order to focus on information choices, we analyze a simplified
approximation to this micro-founded framework. In the underlying model, there is a continuum of
monopolistically competitive firms, each producing a single intermediate good. These intermediates
are bought by a representative household that combines them into a single final consumption good,
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using a CES technology with constant returns to scale. Intermediate firms continuously adjust
the prices for their intermediate goods, based on the information they have about the underlying
monetary shocks. The one non-standard piece of the model is that firms decide whether to pay a
fixed cost to acquire information (“to plan”). Intermediate goods trade at pre-announced prices
and labor inputs adjust to satisfy the resulting demand. All other market prices adjust to clear
markets. Pricing complementarities in the intermediate sector result either from decreasing returns,
or from equilibrium effects on wages and interest rates.
In the online technical appendix, we approximate this underlying model. To do this, we solve for
aggregate allocations and market-clearing prices and wages as a function of the posted intermediate
prices and the exogenous nominal shocks. Then, we determine the intermediate firm’s payoffs,
given their own price pi, the aggregate price p, and the state of aggregate demand s. The objective
function we use below is a quadratic approximation of firms’ payoffs. This objective turns out to
be similar to the one derived by Ball and Romer (1990) for a model with costly price adjustment.
2.1 The model
Time is continuous and infinite. There is a measure 1 continuum of firms. Each firm i’s objective
is to minimize the loss function
E0
{∫ ∞
0
e−ρt (pi (t)− p∗ (t))2 dt+ C
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtdDi (t)
}
, (8)
where pi (t) denotes firm i’s (log-)price at instant t, Di (t) is the process determining the dates at
which the firm acquires information (plans): dDi (t) = 1 if the firm chooses to plan at instant t
and dDi (t) = 0 otherwise; p∗ (t) is an unknown, stochastic target price process that a firm with
full information would set; ρ > 0 is the firms’ discount rate, and C > 0 is the cost of planning.
Following the New Keynesian models of monopolistic competition, the target price is
p∗ (t) = (1− r) s (t) + rp (t) (9)
where s (t) is the log of nominal demand at date t, s (t) − p (t) is the log of real demand, p (t) =
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∫ 1
0 pi (t) di is the average price, and r < 1 is a coefficient indicating the degree of strategic comple-
mentarity or “real rigidity” in price setting. For simplicity, we assume that demand is exogenous:
s (t) = σZ (t), where σ > 0 and Z (t) is a standard Brownian motion.
Information Choices If firm i last planned at date τˆ , it enters date t with an information set
Ii,t = Iτˆ = {Z (t′) : t′ ≤ τˆ}, i.e. the firm knows the path of Z up to and including date τˆ . If this
firm plans in the current date (dDi (t) = 1), its new information set contains all demand realizations
prior to the current date: Ii,t+dt = It = {Z (t′) : t′ ≤ t}.5 If the firm does not plan (dDi (t) = 0),
its information set remains unchanged: Ii,t+dt = Ii,t = Iτˆ ; it does not observe any new information
about the state, including endogenous variables like the aggregate price level. This information
structure comes from Reis (2006). It keeps the model tractable because the firm’s last planning
date pins down its information set. The idea is that firms can always observe these prices, but
using them to infer demand or to re-compute their own optimal price requires a planning cost.
At any date t, the economy is characterized by the cross-sectional distribution of the firms’
last planning dates; Λt (τˆ) ∈ [0, 1] denotes the fraction of firms who last planned prior to date
τˆ . Then 1 − Λt (τˆ) is the fraction of firms who know all the demand realizations up to date τˆ :
{Z (t′)}t′≤τˆ . Let dΛt (τˆ) be the fraction (or density) of firms who last planned exactly on date τˆ
and let Dt (τˆ) ∈ [0, 1] be the probability that a firm who last planned at date τˆ will plan in period
t.
The evolution of Λt (τˆ) can be characterized recursively. The fraction of firms who will have
planned since τˆ at t+dt is the fraction who planned between τ and t, plus the firms that last planned
at any date before τˆ and now choose to plan at date t: Λt+dt (τˆ) = Λt (τˆ)−
∫ τˆ
−∞Dt (τ) dΛt (τ), for
τˆ ≤ t, with Λt (t) = 1.
Equilibrium An equilibrium is a process of prices and planning choices by every firm i, {pi (t) , Di (t)},
that are Ii,t-measurable and maximize (8), taking as given the choices of all other firms.
5This assumption implies that information acquired at date t can not be used simultaneously for pricing decisions,
or equivalently, at each instant, prices are set before planning choices are made.
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Prices and Indirect Utility Next, we characterize average price and target price processes, and
expected losses, for arbitrary planning choices. At date t, a firm that last planned at date τˆ sets its
price equal to its expected target price at time t: pi (t) = E (p∗ (t) |Iτˆ ) = (1− r)E (s (t) |Iτˆ ) +
rE (p (t) |Iτˆ ). The average price is the average of the firms’ expected target prices: p (t) =∫ t
−∞E (p
∗ (t) |Iτˆ ) dΛt (τˆ). Lemma 1 expresses this as a function of the demand shocks Z.
Lemma 2 In equilibrium, p∗ (t) and p (t) are characterized by
p∗ (t) = σ
∫ t
−∞
1− r
1− r + rΛt (τ)dZ (τ) and p (t) = σ
∫ t
−∞
(1− Λt (τ)) (1− r)
1− r + rΛt (τ) dZ (τ) .
Since the expected value of unobserved demand innovations is 0, the expected target price is the
target price integrated over all the known demand realizations. For an agents whose known demand
realizations end at date τˆ , this price is E (p∗ (t) |Iτˆ ) = σ
∫ τˆ
−∞ (1− r) / (1− r + rΛt (τ)) dZ (τ). It is
the price firm i chooses, pi(t).
From equation (9), we know that date-t instantaneous expected loss is E (pi(t)− p∗(t)|Iτˆ )2.
The difference between pi(t) and p∗(t) depends on the demand shocks realized in between the date
τˆ when the firm last planned and t: pi(t) − p∗(t) = σ
∫ t
τˆ (1 − r)/(1 − r + rΛt (τ))dZ (τ). Since the
variance of Z (τ) is 1 per unit time, the variance of the difference in prices is the coefficient squared:
L (t, τˆ) = σ2
∫ t
τˆ
(
1− r
1− r + rΛt (τ)
)2
dτ. (10)
We can use the instantaneous expected loss to construct a Bellman equation that characterizes
the lifetime expected loss of a firm that plans in the current period τˆ and optimally chooses its
next planning date τˆ ′:
L (τˆ) = min
τˆ ′≥τˆ
{∫ τˆ ′
τˆ
e−ρ(t−τˆ)L (t, τˆ) dt+ e−ρ(τˆ
′−τˆ) [C + L (τˆ ′)]} . (11)
The longer it has been since a firm has last planned, the stronger are its incentives to plan at the
current date. An equilibrium is thus characterized by a threshold date τ∗ (t), such that firms who
have not planned since date τ∗ (t) find it strictly optimal to plan at date t, while firms that have
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find not planning strictly optimal.
2.2 Complementarity in Information Choice
When prices are complements, (r > 0), there is a complementarity in planning. When prices are
strategic substitutes (r < 0), the converse is true. This general principle in static models (propo-
sition 1) re-appears in dynamic price-setting. Planning complementarity is important because it
generates delays in price adjustment, which price-setting models are designed to explain.
To see where the planning complementarity arises, consider firms’ per-period loss from not
planning (10). The more firms are aware of the demand innovations that have occurred since
the firm last planned, the higher is the per-period loss of not being aware of these innovations:
∂L (t, τˆ) /∂(1 − Λt (τ)) > 0; this holds for all planning dates τ ∈ (τˆ , t], if and only if prices are
complementary (r > 0). This is the complementarity in planning decisions: the more recently
other firms have planned, the higher is the cost to a firm of not planning in the current period.
To illustrate the effects of planning complementarity on price-setting, we next consider one
equilibrium of this planning game, which has been the focus of previous work (Reis 2006). In this
equilibrium, planning decisions are staggered, meaning that all firms plan after a fixed duration T ,
and over each interval of length dt, a fraction T−1dt of firms plan. This means that if τ < t − T ,
then Λt (τ) = 0, but if t − T < τ ≤ t, Λt (τ) = 1 − (t− τ) /T . Therefore, a firm who last planned
at date τˆ has an instantaneous expect loss
L (t, τˆ) =
 σ
2
∫ t
τˆ
(
1−r
1−r(t−τ)/T
)2
dτ if τˆ > t− T
σ2
∫ t
t−T
(
1−r
1−r(t−τ)/T
)2
dτ + σ2 (t− T − τˆ) if τˆ < t− T
(12)
Using (12), we can solve the firm’s Bellman equation to determine when it is optimal to plan and
characterize the equilibrium planning horizon T .
Proposition 3 A Staggered Planning Equilibrium: There is a unique staggered planning
equilibrium. The equilibrium planning horizon T is defined by C = σ2 (1− r)T 2 ∫ 10 e−ρTθ 1−θ1−rθdθ .
More complementarity (higher r) lengthens the equilibrium planning horizon T .
The pricing complementarity generates delays in price adjustment through two channels: First,
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because many other firms have prices based on old information, firms that do plan temper their
reactions to recent information. This is the standard effect of complementarities in pricing mod-
els. Second, longer planning horizons means less information acquisition and less frequent price
adjustment. Because many firms have old information, having outdated information is less costly,
and frequent planning is less beneficial. This is planning complementarity. It amplifies the pricing
complementarity to create long delays in price adjustment.
Reis (2006) uses this effect to match the empirical extent of price rigidity. Our theory results
explain why it arises. As in the theory results, complementarity and covariance are mutually
reinforcing effects. With more incomplete information, the covariance of average prices and demand
falls. As that covariance falls, the incentive to plan for any individual firm falls because the
aggregate price level becomes more predictable on the basis of their old information. This covariance
effect is both the source of the information complementary and the key result of the price-setting
model that allows it to match the data.
2.3 Multiple Equilibria
Although complementarity in price-setting and in information acquisition helps to slow price ad-
justment, it has a downside. The complementarity also generates multiple synchronized equilibria,
in which all firms choose to plan at the same dates. The reason these equilibria arise is that when
all firms plan at the same date, this introduces a discontinuity in the marginal value of planning at
that date.
Without ruling out any other possibilities, we consider synchronized planning equilibria, in
which all firms decide to plan at intervals of length T , and update their information at dates
{T, 2T, 3T, ...}, for some T > 0. Let t denote the current date, and suppose all other firms last
planned at date τ˜ (Λt (τ) = 0 if τ ≤ τ˜ and Λt (τ) = 1 if τ ∈ (τ˜ , t]). All firms therefore know the
path of nominal spending s (t) up until date τ˜ , while its more recent realizations remain unknown.
For an individual firm that last planned in period τˆ , its period-t expected loss is
L (t, τˆ) =
 σ2 (1− r)
2 (t− τˆ) if τˆ ≥ τ˜
σ2 (1− r)2 (t− τ˜) + σ2 (τ˜ − τˆ) if τˆ < τ˜
(13)
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Consider now how L (t, τˆ) changes when all the others plan in the current period (τ˜ shifts to
τ˜ = t). If r > 0, this leads to a discrete increase in L (t, τˆ), meaning that the loss from having
outdated information rises discretely once the other firms have more recent information. This
discrete jump generates multiple equilibria. When instead r < 0, an agent’s instantaneous loss
decreases discretely when all the other firms plan; this in turn implies that synchronized planning
cannot be sustained as an equilibrium, when pricing decisions are substitutes.
Proposition 4 Multiple synchronized planning equilibria
i. If r ∈ (0, 1), then any common planning horizon T ∈ [T , T¯ ] is a synchronized planning
equilibrium, where T solves C = σ2T 2
∫ 1
0 e
−ρTθ (1− θ) dθ and T¯ solves
C = (1− r)2 σ2T¯ 2 ∫ 10 e−ρT¯ θ (1− θ) dθ.
ii. If r = 0, there exists a unique synchronized planning equilibrium with a planning horizon T ∗
implicitly defined by C = σ2 (T ∗)2
∫ 1
0 e
−ρT ∗θ (1− θ) dθ.
iii. If r < 0, there does not exist a synchronized planning equilibrium.
The range of synchronized planning equilibria is bounded by two values: T¯ is the planning
horizon that would be optimal for any given firm, if all other firms were to never do any planning,
while T is the planning horizon that would be optimal for a given firm, if all other firms always
had complete information.
When actions are complements (r > 0), proposition 4 leaves open the possibility that there are
other synchronized planning equilibria with horizons outside the interval
[
T , T¯
]
. The actual range
of synchronized planning equilibria can easily be computed numerically. For any T > 0, define the
last planning date τˆ ∈ [0, T ] as the firm’s state variable, and let L (τˆ) denote the lifetime expected
loss of a firm that just planned at date τˆ .
The firm’s optimal planning strategy is then characterized by solving the Bellman equation
(11), where L (τˆ) = L (τˆ − T ) for any τˆ ≥ T , and L (t, τˆ) is given as above by (14), with τ˜ = nT ,
for t ∈ (nT, (n+ 1)T ]. There exists a synchronized planning equilibrium if and only if the solution
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to this Bellman equation satisfies
L (0) = 1
1− e−ρT
{
(1− r)2 σ2
∫ T
0
e−ρttdt+ e−ρTC
}
. (14)
Condition (14) implies that the proposed strategies do attain the optimum payoffs and hence
constitute an equilibrium.
Appendix A.9 derives bounds T and T such that synchronized planning cannot be an equilib-
rium, whenever T /∈
[
T , T
]
. These bounds are constructed by considering two types of deviations
that must be unprofitable in equilibrium: (1) marginal deviations that postpone or advance plan-
ning by a short time period and (2) deviations that skip a planning date or add extra dates, given
that all other firms plan at dates {T, 2T, . . .}. Numerical simulation confirms that any T ∈
[
T , T
]
is
sustainable as a synchronized planning equilibrium. In other words, our necessary condition turns
out to be sufficient as well.
Howmuch does this matter for pricing? Multiple equilibria are not just a theoretical concern.
They open up a range of predictions for planning horizons and price rigidity, for commonly used
parameters. Figure 3 illustrates the set of equilibrium planning horizons sustainable for a range
of complementarity parameters. If price complementarity (r) is 0.85, a level commonly used in
new Keynesian models, possible planning horizons range from 3.2 to 64 quarters. The rate of
price-adjustment varies greatly, depending on which of these equilibria firms select.
Multiple equilibria arise because the information firms observe when they plan is potentially
public. Like reading an extra page of the newspaper, planning earlier than others plan delivers extra
private information. When firms coordinate planning, they obtain public information, which is
more valuable. The discontinuous value of information at the synchronized planning date produces
multiplicity.
2.4 Using Private Information To Make Equilibria Unique
Staggered Planning with a Continuous Choice Space Two key features of Mankiw and
Reis (2002) and Reis (2006) deliver a unique equilibrium and gradual price adjustment. First,
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Figure 3: Equilibrium planning horizons for synchronized planning (shaded) and staggered planning
(line). Two parameters being held fixed. One is the discount rate ρ = 0.01, which implies a 4% annual rate of
time-preference. Second is the ratio of the cost of information to the variance of demand shocks C/σ2 = 13. This
matches the 10-period staggered planning horizon in Reis (2006), for his calibrated degree of real rigidity, r = 0.85.
they use continuous time. Second, they restrict the model to staggered planning equilibria where
a constant fraction of firms plan at every date.
Since planning decisions are timing choices, the use of discrete time introduces discreteness in
information choices. As in section 1.3.1, discreteness creates additional equilibria, both staggered
and synchronized ones.6 In continuous time, multiple synchronized planning equilibria persist but
the staggered equilibrium is unique. The reason is revealed in section 1.3.2. When firms synchronize
their learning, they learn the same information as all other firms. Thus this is a public information
choice problem which produces multiple equilibria. By staggering their planning, firms observe
private information that others do not observe. The combination of private information and a
continuous choice set delivers unique model predictions.
While restricting attention to staggered planning equilibria resolves the multiplicity problem, it
does compromise the model’s robustness. The predictions now depend crucially on the assumption
that firms will stagger their planning. It is more desirable if the source of equilibrium uniqueness
is micro-founded, supported by evidence, or is an integral part of the theory. The second example
moves in this direction.
6A previous version of the paper examined the discrete-time version of this model.
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Rational Inattention An example of a price-setting model that has both private information
and a continuous choice set is Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2006). They model rational agents who
have limited information processing capability, as in Sims (2003), and who choose what shocks
to observe more precisely and which to observe less precisely. The nature of the limited channel
capacity is such that each agent observes signals with noise that is unique to them and is independent
across agents. In other words, this way of modeling imperfect information ensures that signals are
private and conditionally independent. While the mechanics of this model are quite similar to Reis
(2006), Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2006) show that their equilibrium is unique. The uniqueness
comes from the continuous nature of the precision allocation choice coupled with the private nature
of the signal errors inherent to rational inattention.
3 Conclusions
Our results offer simple guidance on information choice in strategic settings. When actions are
strategic substitutes, information is a substitute; when actions are complementary, information is a
strategic complement. This strategic nature of information choice is central to price-setting models
with costly information. Planning complementarity delays the adjustment of prices to shocks. But
the same complementarity can lead firms to synchronize learning and adjust prices simultaneously.
It can also generate multiple equilibria. These results do not make costly planning an untenable
model. They do tell us what model features make the equilibrium unique: The information choice
must be continuous and the signals must be private. This prescription is similar but not identical
to that of Morris and Shin (1998). While a small amount of heterogeneity in beliefs produces
unique outcomes in action games, information choice imposes the more stringent requirement that
the signals in the information choice set are private, with independent errors.
Allowing agents to freely observe aggregate variables, such as prices, may or may not change
the strategic incentives to acquire information. For example, in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980),
actions are strategic substitutes. Prices introduce an additional free-rider effect, that reinforces
substitutability in information choice: When others observe information, prices reveal some of
it publicly, which reduces the value of additional information. In contrast, Barlevy and Veronesi
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(2000) generate information complementarity in the same setting, because more private information
makes their asset prices less informative. Whether our conclusions are reversed or strengthened
depends on the distribution of the noise in the asset’s price. We leave the analysis of information
complementarity, in the presence of an observable price, for future work.
All our results can be traced back to one root cause: Information acquisition changes the co-
variance of the state with the aggregate action. The same idea could explain changing covariances
in macroeconomic variables. In fact, instability in the covariance of fundamentals and outcomes
is a pervasive feature of macro time series, the most unstable variable being inflation (Stock and
Watson 1996). More specifically, Olivei and Tenreyro (2007) document that monetary policy has
stronger and faster effects in the beginning of the year and argue that this is because of synchroniza-
tion in wage adjustments. A model of this phenomenon might resemble Cooper and John (1988)
with regime changes in information choice. But instead of high-action and low-action regimes
typical of action coordination games, actions covary strongly with an underlying state when it is
observed precisely, and do not covary much when information about the state is scarce. Informa-
tion demand might fluctuate for at least three reasons, 1) synchronized planning creates discrete
changes in information demand at planning dates, 2) switches between multiple information equi-
libria, or sunspots, or 3) changes in information costs. Information choice offers one theory for why
relationships between fundamentals and choices might fluctuate over time. Therefore, improving
our understanding and prediction of information choice could help economists to better understand
and forecast the relationships between macroeconomic fundamentals and aggregate actions.
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A Proofs and Derivations
The expressions used for Bayesian updating (section 1.2.1) and equations (4) - (8) in the main text involve lots of
algebraic manipulation at each step. Here, we provide additional detail for the reader who wants to replicate these
expressions, along with proofs of the lemmas and propositions.
A.1 Bayesian updating
Equations (2) and (3) in the main text are standard formulas for the linear projection of one normal variable
on another. We therefore need to derive the relevant unconditional variance and covariance terms. From zi =
1n·s+Au+Bvi, we have  su
Xzi
 =
 1 0 00 Ik 0
X1n XA XB
 su
vi
 .
Now, recall that if x ∼ N (µ,Σ), then Cx ∼ N (Cµ,CΣC′). Since (s,u,vi) is jointly normally distributed with mean
zero and variance-covariance matrix being the identity, it follows that
(
s,u,Xzi
)
is jointly normally distributed with
mean zero and variance-covariance matrix equal to 1 0 00 Ik 0
X1n XA XB
 1 0 1′nX ′0 Ik A′X ′
0 0 B′X ′
 =
 1 0 1′nX ′0 Ik A′X ′
X1n XA XΓΓ
′X ′

where Γ ≡ [1n, A,B]. Using the definition of ω = [s,u′]′, we can therefore read off the relevant variance and covariance
terms: V ar(ω) = V ar([s,u′]′) = Ik+1, V ar
(
Xzi
)
= XΓΓ′X ′, and Cov(ω,Xzi) = [X1n,XA] = [1m, XA], where we
use the fact that X1n = 1m, because X is an m× n matrix with a one in each row.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1: Information set rankings and posterior variance
Since part (ii) is an immediate consequence of part (i), we focus just on (i). Consider therefore two information
choices χ and χ′, such that χ − χ′ ≥ 0 entry by entry, and χm − χ′m = 1, for some m (if χ = χ′, the result holds
trivially). Let X1 = Xχ′ and X2 = Xχ−χ′ , and notice that Xχ =
(
X ′1 X
′
2
)′
, up to a permutation of rows (since
our definition - arbitrarily - orders signals in Xχz
i according to the same order as in zi).
Substituting in the variances and covariances into (3) results in
Σ(χ) = I1+k −
[
1′n
F ′
]
X ′
{
XΓΓ′X ′
}−1
X
[
1n F
]
.
Thus, Σ (χ′)−Σ(χ) is positive semi-definite, if and only if X ′χ
{
XχΓΓ
′X ′χ
}−1
Xχ−X ′χ′
{
Xχ′ΓΓ
′X ′χ′
}−1
Xχ′ is positive
semi-definite. To compute these matrices, notice that
XχΓΓ
′X ′χ =
(
X1
X2
)
ΓΓ′
(
X ′1 X
′
2
)
=
(
F G
G′ H
)
where F = X1ΓΓ
′X ′1, G = X1ΓΓ
′X ′2, and H = X2ΓΓ
′X ′2. Inverting this matrix, we have{
XχΓΓ
′X ′χ
}−1
=
(
Fˆ Gˆ
Gˆ′ Hˆ
)
where Fˆ =
(
F −GH−1G′)−1, Gˆ = − (F −GH−1G′)−1GH−1 = −F−1G (H −G′F−1G)−1, and
Hˆ =
(
H −G′F−1G)−1. It follows that
X ′χ
{
XχΓΓ
′X ′χ
}−1
Xχ =
(
X ′1 X
′
2
)( Fˆ Gˆ
Gˆ′ Hˆ
)(
X1
X2
)
= X ′1FˆX1 +X
′
2Gˆ
′X1 +X
′
1GˆX2 +X
′
2HˆX2
= X ′1FˆX1 −X ′2
(
H −G′F−1G)−1G′F−1X1 −X ′1F−1G (H −G′F−1G)−1X2
+X ′2
(
H −G′F−1G)−1X2
= X ′1FˆX1 −X ′1F−1G
(
H −G′F−1G)−1G′F−1X1
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+
(
X ′2 −X ′1F−1G
) (
H −G′F−1G)−1 (X2 −G′F−1X1)
= X ′1
[(
F −GH−1G′)−1 − (F −GH−1G′)−1GH−1G′F−1]X1
+
(
X ′2 −X ′1F−1G
) (
H −G′F−1G)−1 (X2 −G′F−1X1)
= X ′1F
−1X1 +
(
X ′2 −X ′1F−1G
) (
H −G′F−1G)−1 (X2 −G′F−1X1) .
On the other hand, X ′χ′
{
Xχ′ΓΓ
′X ′χ′
}−1
Xχ′ = X
′
1 {X1ΓΓ′X ′1}−1X1 = X ′1F−1X1. It therefore suffices to show that(
H −G′F−1G)−1, or equivalently H −G′F−1G, is positive semi-definite. Now,
H −G′F−1G = X2ΓΓ′X ′2 −X2ΓΓ′X ′1
{
X1ΓΓ
′X ′1
}−1
X1ΓΓ
′X ′2
= X2Γ
{
I − Γ′X ′1
{
X1ΓΓ
′X ′1
}−1
X1Γ
}
Γ′X ′2.
The matrix I − Γ′X ′1 {X1ΓΓ′X ′1}−1X1Γ is symmetric and idempotent, and therefore it is positive semi-definite, and
so is H −G′F−1G.
A.3 Derivation of equations 4-7
Derivation of equation 4 and proof that this characterizes an equilibrium Averaging the
agents’ first-order condition across all agents, we find that the average price must satisfy p¯ = (1− r) E¯(s) + rE¯(p¯).
If we repeatedly substitute this expression into the agents’ first-order condition, we find that any equilibrium price
must satisfy
p
(
Ii
)
= (1− r)Ei(s) + r (1− r)EiE¯(s) + r2EiE¯(p¯) = (1− r)
K∑
k=0
rkEi
(
E¯(k)(s)
)
+ rK+1Ei
(
E¯(K)(p¯)
)
If we let K go to infinity and conjecture that limK→∞ rK+1Ei
(
E¯(K)(p¯)
)
= 0, we arrive at the definition of pˆ that
is given in the main text. We can check that this indeed constitutes an equilibrium, by substituting it back into the
right-hand-side of the agents’ first-order condition: Averaging pˆ across all i, we find p¯ = (1− r)∑∞k=0 rk (E¯(k+1)(s)),
so the right side of the agents’ first-order condition becomes
(1− r)Ei(s) + rEi(p¯) = (1− r)Ei(s) + rEi((1− r)
∞∑
k=0
rkE¯(k+1)(s)
= (1− r)Ei(s) + (1− r)
∞∑
k=0
rk+1Ei(E¯(k+1)(s))
= (1− r)Ei(s) + (1− r)
∞∑
k=1
rkEi(E¯(k)(s))
= (1− r)
∞∑
k=0
rkEi(E¯(k)(s)) = pˆ
(
Ii
)
,
where we have first pulled the expectation and r inside the summation, then changed the index of the summation,
and finally combined the terms.
Derive equation 5 Equation (2) in the main text gives us E
(
ω|Xzi) = [1m,XA]′ [XΓΓ′X ′]−1Xzi. Integrating
this expression across all agents, we find the average expectations of ω:
E¯(ω) =
∫
i
E
(
ω|Xzi
)
dµ(χi) =
∫ ∫
[1m,XA]
′ [XΓΓ′X ′]−1XzidΦ(zi|ω) dµ(χ)
=
∫
[1m, XA]
′ [XΓΓ′X ′]−1X ∫ zidΦ(zi|ω) dµ(χ).
Next we solve the inside integral. Since zi = [1n, A]ω +Bv
i, we can rewrite this as∫
zidΦ
(
zi|ω
)
=
∫ [
[1n, A]ω +Bv
i
]
dΦ
(
vi
)
= [1n, A]ω +B
∫
vidΦ
(
vi
)
= [1n, A]ω,
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due to the fact that the cross-sectional mean of the vi’s is zero. We substitute this back into the expression for E¯(ω)
and solve the outer integral:
E¯(ω) =
∫
[1m, XA]
′ [XΓΓ′X ′]−1X[1n, A]ωdµ(χ) = ∫ [1m,XA]′ [XΓΓ′X ′]−1X[1n, A]dµ(χ) · ω
=
∫
[1m, XA]
′ [XΓΓ′X ′]−1 [1m, XA]dµ(χ) · ω,
where we have once again used the fact that X1n = 1m. Now, using equation (3) from the main text, which states
that Σ(χi) = I − [1m,XA]′ [XΓΓ′X ′]−1 [1m, XA], along with the definition Σ¯(µ) =
∫
Σ(χi)dµ(χi), we find
E¯(ω) =
[
I −
∫
Σ(χi)dµ(χi)
]
· ω = [I − Σ¯(µ)]ω.
We next prove by induction that E¯(k)(ω) = [I − Σ¯(µ)]kω. For this, notice that the result already holds for k = 0
and k = 1, and suppose that it also holds for arbitrary k − 1. Then,
E¯(k)(ω) =
∫
i
E
[
E¯(k−1)(ω)|Xzi
]
dµ(χi) =
∫
i
E
[
[I − Σ¯(µ)]k−1ω|Xzi
]
dµ(χi)
= [I − Σ¯(µ)]k−1
∫
i
E
[
ω|Xzi
]
dµ(χi) = [I − Σ¯(µ)]k−1[I − Σ¯(µ)]ω = [I − Σ¯(µ)]kω.
The first equality follows from the definition of E¯ (·), the second uses the induction hypothesis, the third takes the
non-stochastic matrix [I − Σ¯(µ)]k−1 outside the expectation, and the fourth makes use of our above characterization
for E¯(ω).
Finally, we solve out for the pricing function in equation (4). We first substitute s = b′ω into the equation and
take b outside the expectations. We then substitute in for the sequence of higher-order expectations E¯(k)(ω), and
solve out the infinite sum expression:
pˆ
(
Ii
)
= (1− r)b′
∞∑
k=0
rkE
(
E¯(k)(ω)|Ii
)
= (1− r)b′
∞∑
k=0
rkE
(
[I − Σ¯(µ)]kω|Ii
)
= (1− r)b′
∞∑
k=0
rk[I − Σ¯(µ)]kE
(
ω|Ii
)
= (1− r)b′ [I − r[I − Σ¯(µ)]]−1 E (ω|Ii) .
Derive p∗ The target price p∗ is defined as p∗ = (1− r)s+ rp¯. Substituting s = b′ω and
p¯ = (1− r)b′ [(1− r)I + rΣ¯(µ)]−1 (I − Σ¯(µ))ω into this expression, we find
p∗ = (1− r)b′ω + r (1− r)b′ [(1− r)I + rΣ¯(µ)]−1 (I − Σ¯(µ))ω
= (1− r)b′
{
I + r
[
(1− r)I + rΣ¯(µ)]−1 (I − Σ¯(µ))}ω
= (1− r)b′ [(1− r)I + rΣ¯(µ)]−1 {(1− r)I + rΣ¯(µ) + r(I − Σ¯(µ))}ω
= (1− r)b′ [(1− r)I + rΣ¯(µ)]−1 ω
Derive equation 6 Equation (1) defines realized utility. Taking its expectation, conditional on agent i’s
information,
EiU = Ei
[
− 1
(1− r)2 (p
∗ − pi)2
]
= − 1
(1− r)2E
i {(p∗ − pi) (p∗ − pi)′} .
From the equilibrium characterization, we have p∗ − pi = (1− r)b′
[
(1− r)I + rΣ¯(µ)]−1 (ω−Ei (ω)). We substitute
this into EiU , and make use of the fact that Ei
{(
ω−Ei (ω)) (ω′ − Ei (ω′))} corresponds to the posterior variance
covariance matrix, Σ (χ):
EiU = −Ei
{
b′
[
(1− r)I + rΣ¯(µ)]−1 (ω−Ei (ω))(ω′ − Ei (ω′)) [(1− r)I + rΣ¯(µ)]−1 b}
= −b′ [(1− r)I + rΣ¯(µ)]−1 Ei {(ω−Ei (ω))(ω′ − Ei (ω′))} [(1− r)I + rΣ¯(µ)]−1 b
= −b′ [(1− r)I + rΣ¯(µ)]−1 Σ(χ) [(1− r)I + rΣ¯(µ)]−1 b
Since there is no ex ante uncertainty about these second moments, this is also agents’ unconditional expected utility.
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Derive equation 7 Using the fact that s = b′ω and the derivation of p¯, cov(p¯, s) becomes
cov(p¯,b′ω) = cov
(
(1− r)b′ [(1− r)I + rΣ¯(µ)]−1 (I − Σ¯(µ))ω, b′ω) .
Pulling the various matrices out of this covariance expression, and once again using
cov(ω, ω) = E
{(
ω−Ei (ω)) (ω′ − Ei (ω′))} = Σ(χ), we find
cov(p¯,b′ω) = (1− r)b′ [(1− r)I + rΣ¯(µ)]−1 (I − Σ¯(µ))cov (ω;ω)b
= (1− r)b′ [(1− r)I + rΣ¯(µ)]−1 (I − Σ¯(µ))Σ(χ)b.
The same expression with I instead of Σ(χ) characterizes the unconditional covariance of p¯ and s.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 1: Strategic incentives in information choice
The proof for no strategic interactions (r = 0) follows directly from the expected utility function.
For the case where r 6= 0, define Ψ (µ) ≡ I − Σ¯ (µ). Recall that b′ = [ 1 0 . . . 0 ]. Rearranging terms, we have
EU (χ, µ)− EU (χ′, µ)− (EU (χ, µ′)− EU (χ′, µ′))
= b′ [I − rΨ(µ)]−1 [Σ (χ′)− Σ(χ)] [I − rΨ(µ)]−1 b
−b′ [I − rΨ (µ′)]−1 [Σ (χ′)− Σ(χ)] [I − rΨ (µ′)]−1 b
= b′
{
[I − rΨ(µ)]−1 − [I − rΨ (µ′)]−1} [Σ (χ′)− Σ(χ)] [I − rΨ(µ)]−1 b
+b′
[
I − rΨ (µ′)]−1 [Σ (χ′)− Σ(χ)] {[I − rΨ(µ)]−1 − [I − rΨ (µ′)]−1}b
= b′
{
[I − rΨ(µ)]−1 − [I − rΨ (µ′)]−1} [Σ (χ′)− Σ(χ)] [I − rΨ(µ)]−1 b
+b′
{
[I − rΨ(µ)]−1 − [I − rΨ (µ′)]−1} [Σ (χ′)− Σ(χ)] [I − rΨ (µ′)]−1 b
= b′
{
[I − rΨ(µ)]−1 − [I − rΨ (µ′)]−1} [Σ (χ′)− Σ(χ)] {[I − rΨ(µ)]−1 + [I − rΨ (µ′)]−1}b
where the second-to-last step follows from symmetry (of a 1×1 matrix). In what follows, we use > 0 to signify that a
matrix is positive definite and < 0 to mean negative definite. We also use the fact that sums and products of positive
definite matrices are positive definite. Clearly, Σ (χ′)−Σ(χ) > 0 and [I − rΨ(µ)]−1+[I − rΨ(µ′)]−1 > 0. Moreover,
if r > 0, Ψ (µ) − Ψ(µ′) > 0 implies r (Ψ (µ)−Ψ(µ′)) > 0 and [I − rΨ(µ)]−1 − [I − rΨ(µ′)]−1 > 0. Since any
positive-definite matrix, pre- and post-multiplied by the same vector yields a positive scalar, the overall expression is
positive whenever r > 0. Likewise, if r < 0, [I − rΨ(µ)]−1 − [I − rΨ(µ′)]−1 < 0 implying that the overall expression
is negative.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2: Multiple equilibria
The definition of A and B implies that ΓΓ′ = 1n1′n + δ
−1In, from which it follows that for any χ ∈ {0, 1}n,
XχΓΓ
′X ′χ = 1n˜1
′
n˜ + δ
−1In˜, and hence
{
XχΓΓ
′X ′χ
}−1
= δIn˜ −
(
δ2/ (1 + δn˜)
)
1n˜1
′
n˜, where n˜ is the number of signals
observed under χ.
First, we solve for the equilibrium when all agents choose the same χ. Without loss of generality, suppose that
this χ dictates that agents observe the first n˜ signals. Then, Xχ = [In˜ 0n−n˜], and Xχ [1n A] =
[
1n˜ γδ
−1/2In˜ 0n−n˜×n˜
]
,
using the fact that A = γδ−1/2In. Therefore,
Σ¯ (µ) = I1+n −
 1′n˜γδ−1/2In˜
0n−n˜×n˜
 [δIn˜ − (δ2/ (1 + δn˜))1n˜1′n˜] [1n˜ γδ−1/2In˜ 0n−n˜×n˜]
= I1+n −
 δn˜1+δn˜ γδ
1/2
1+δn˜
1′n˜ 01×n−n˜
γδ1/2
1+δn˜
1n˜ γ
2In˜ − γ2δ1+δn˜1n˜1′n˜ 0n˜×n−n˜
0n−n˜×1 0n−n˜×n˜ 0n−n˜×n−n˜

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Then, (1− r) I1+n + rΣ¯ (µ) takes the form
(1− r) I1+n+rΣ¯ (µ) = I1+n−r
 δn˜1+δn˜ γδ
1/2
1+δn˜
1′n˜ 01×n−n˜
γδ1/2
1+δn˜
1n˜ γ
2In˜ − γ2δ1+δn˜1n˜1′n˜ 0n˜×n−n˜
0n−n˜×1 0n−n˜×n˜ 0n−n˜×n−n˜
 =
 a b1′n˜ 01×n−n˜b1n˜ cIn˜ + d1n˜1′n˜ 0n˜×n−n˜
0n−n˜×1 0n−n˜×n˜ In−n˜×n−n˜

where a = 1− r δn˜
1+δn˜
, b = −r γδ1/2
1+δn˜
, c = 1− rγ2, and d = r γ2δ
1+δn˜
.
[
(1− r) I1+n + rΣ¯ (µ)
]−1
then takes the form
[
(1− r) I1+n + rΣ¯ (µ)
]−1
=
 α β1′n˜ 01×n−n˜β1n˜ c−1In˜ + ϑ1n˜1′n˜ 0n˜×n−n˜
0n−n˜×1 0n−n˜×n˜ In−n˜×n−n˜

where aα + βbn˜ = 1, bα + βc + βdn˜ = 0, aβ + b/c + bϑn˜ = 0 and bβ + cϑ + d/c + dϑn˜ = 0. These conditions are
solved by
α =
c+ dn˜
a (c+ dn˜)− b2n˜ =
1− rγ2 + δn˜
1− rγ2 + (1− r) δn˜
β = − b
a (c+ dn˜)− b2n˜ =
rγδ1/2
1− rγ2 + (1− r) δn˜
ϑ =
(
b2 − ad) /c
a (c+ dn˜)− b2n˜ =
1− r
1− rγ2
rγ2δ
1− rγ2 + (1− r) δn˜
and therefore, b′
[
(1− r) I1+k + rΣ¯ (µ)
]−1
= [α β1′n˜ 0].
Next, we derive an agent’s best response to the conjectured information choice and equilibrium strategies. Any
information choice χ is summarized by two numbers mˆ and nˆ, where nˆ denotes the agents’ total number of signals
observed, and mˆ ≤ min {nˆ, n˜} the number of signals that are within the first n˜, and hence shared with all other
agents. To confirm our conjecture, we must verify when an agent optimally chooses to observe the same signals as
other agents (mˆ = nˆ = n˜).
Without loss of generality, let us suppose that the agent chooses to observe the first mˆ signals (which are shared
with all others) and the last nˆ− mˆ signals (which are not shared). Then,
X(nˆ,mˆ) =
[
Imˆ 0mˆ×n−nˆ 0mˆ×nˆ−mˆ
0nˆ−mˆ×mˆ 0nˆ−mˆ×n−nˆ Inˆ−mˆ
]
,
X(nˆ,mˆ) [1n A] =
[
1mˆ γδ
−1/2Imˆ 0mˆ×n−nˆ 0mˆ×nˆ−mˆ
1nˆ−mˆ 0nˆ−mˆ×mˆ 0nˆ−mˆ×n−nˆ γδ−1/2Inˆ−mˆ
]
, and
and Σ (nˆ, mˆ) = I1+n − [1′n A′]′X ′(nˆ,mˆ)
{
δInˆ −
(
δ2/ (1 + δnˆ)
)
1nˆ1
′
nˆ
}
X(nˆ,mˆ) [1n A], or
Σ (nˆ, mˆ) = I1+n −

nˆδ
1+nˆδ
γδ1/2
1+δnˆ
1′mˆ 01×n−nˆ
γδ1/2
1+δnˆ
1′nˆ−mˆ
γδ1/2
1+δnˆ
1mˆ γ
2Imˆ − γ2δ1+δnˆ1mˆ1′mˆ 0mˆ×n−nˆ − γ
2δ
1+δnˆ
1mˆ1
′
nˆ−mˆ
0n−nˆ×1 0n−nˆ×mˆ 0n−nˆ×n−nˆ 0n−nˆ×nˆ−mˆ
γδ1/2
1+δnˆ
1nˆ−mˆ − γ2δ1+δnˆ1nˆ−mˆ1′mˆ 0nˆ−mˆ×n−nˆ γ2Inˆ−mˆ − γ
2δ
1+δnˆ
1nˆ−mˆ1′nˆ−mˆ

Pre-and post-multiplying this matrix by [α β1′n˜ 0], we find
EU (nˆ, mˆ; n˜) = −{α2 + n˜β2}+ [α β1′mˆ]
[
nˆδ
1+nˆδ
γδ1/2
1+δnˆ
1′mˆ
γδ1/2
1+δnˆ
1mˆ γ
2Imˆ − γ2δ1+δnˆ1mˆ1′mˆ
][
α
β1mˆ
]
= −{α2 + n˜β2}+ 1
1 + nˆδ
{
nˆδα2 + 2δ1/2αγmˆβ + γ2 (1 + δnˆ) mˆβ2 − γ2δmˆ2β2
}
= − 1
1 + δnˆ
{
α2 − 2δ1/2αγmˆβ + γ2δmˆ2β2
}
− n˜β2 + γ2mˆβ2
= − 1
1 + δnˆ
[
α− δ1/2γmˆβ
]2
− (n˜− γ2mˆ)β2
=
−1
[1− rγ2 + (1− r) δn˜]2
{
r2γ2
(
1− γ2) δn˜+ r2γ4δ (n˜− mˆ) + [(1− rγ2) (1 + δn˜) + rγ2δ (n˜− mˆ)]2
1 + δnˆ
}
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When rγ2 = 0, this expression reduces to EU (nˆ, mˆ; n˜) = − (1 + δn˜)2 [1 + (1− r) δn˜]−2 (1 + nˆδ)−1. In the limit
as δ → 0, this yields a unique optimal level of information characterized by ∂EU (nˆ, mˆ; n˜) /∂nˆ =
(1 + δn˜)2 [1 + (1− r) δn˜]−2 (1 + nˆδ)−2 = C′ (nˆδ). At the equilibrium, nˆ = n˜, or
1
[1 + (1− r) δn˜]2 = C
′ (nˆδ) .
When rγ2 > 0, EU (nˆ, mˆ; n˜) is strictly increasing and concave in mˆ for mˆ ≤ n˜, implying that it is optimal to set
mˆ = min {n˜, nˆ}. We therefore need to check when it is optimal to set n˜ = nˆ, i.e. acquire exactly the same signals as
all the others. For this, we consider separately the two deviations when nˆ > n˜ and nˆ < n˜. When nˆ > n˜, mˆ = n˜, and
EU (nˆ, n˜; n˜) = − 1
[1− rγ2 + (1− r) δn˜]2
{(
1− rγ2)2 (1 + δn˜)2
1 + nˆδ
+ r2γ2
(
1− γ2) δn˜}
which is increasing and concave in nˆ. Therefore, nˆ > n˜ is strictly worse than nˆ = n˜, whenever(
1− rγ2)2
[1− rγ2 + (1− r) δn˜]2 ≤ C
′ (δn˜) .
On the other hand, if nˆ < n˜, mˆ = nˆ, and
EU (nˆ, nˆ; n˜) = − 1
[1− rγ2 + (1− r) δn˜]2
{((
1− rγ2) (1 + δn˜) + rγ2δ (n˜− nˆ))2
1 + nˆδ
+ r2γ2δ
(
n˜− γ2nˆ)}
= − 1
[1− rγ2 + (1− r) δn˜]2
{(
1− rγ2) (1 + δn˜) + r2γ2 (1− γ2) δn˜+ (1 + δn˜) δ (n˜− nˆ)
1 + nˆδ
}
Taking the derivative w.r.t. nˆ yields
dEU (nˆ, nˆ; n˜)
dnˆ
=
δ
[1− rγ2 + (1− r) δn˜]2
(
1 + δn˜
1 + δnˆ
)2
,
which is positive and decreasing in nˆ. Therefore, setting nˆ = n˜ is optimal, whenever (dEU (nˆ, nˆ; n˜) /dnˆ) |nˆ=n˜ ≥
δC′ (δn˜), or equivalently,
1
[1− rγ2 + (1− r) δn˜]2 ≥ C
′ (δn˜) .
Finally, when rγ2 < 0, we wish to rule out the existence of pure strategy equilibria. To do so, we consider
the change in payoffs of an agent who deviates from the proposed equilibrium profile of setting n˜ = nˆ = mˆ, by
increasing nˆ to n˜ + 1, or by reducing nˆ and mˆ to n˜ − 1. The above derivations for the case rγ2 > 0 imply that the
former deviation increases payoffs, whenever
(
1− rγ2)2 / [1− rγ2 + (1− r) δn˜]2 > C′ (δn˜), while the latter increases
payoffs, whenever 1/
[
1− rγ2 + (1− r) δn˜]2 < C′ (δn˜). When rγ2 < 0, we immediately find that either one or the
other of these inequalities is satisfied, thus ruling out the possibility of a pure strategy equilibrium.
Uniqueness of Private information equilibrium
The above proof implies that there is a unique pure strategy equilibrium in the limit as δ → 0, when information
is private, or when there are no complementarities (rγ2 = 0). To show that this is the unique equilibrium, we need
to rule out the possibility of mixed equilibria in the limit. Now, notice that when A = 0,
Σ (χ) =
(
Σ11 (χ) 01×n
0n×1 In
)
where the (1, 1)th entry Σ11 (χ) is given by Σ11 (χ) = 1−1′nX ′χ
{
XχΓΓ
′X ′χ
}−1
Xχ1n = (1 + δn˜χ)
−1, where n˜χ is the
number of signals observed under χ. Payoffs in turn are given by EU (χ, µ) =
[
1− r + rΣ¯11 (µ)
]−2
Σ11 (χ), where
Σ¯11 (µ) is the (1, 1)th entry of Σ¯ (µ). In this special case, beliefs and actions are not affected by common signal noise,
and hence payoffs are only affected by individual and average uncertainty about the state s, which is measured by the
(1, 1) entries of Σ11 (χ) and Σ¯11 (µ). Weakening the requirement of definitions 1 and 2), we can say that information
choice χ is more informative as χ′, if and only if n˜χ ≥ n˜χ′ .
Since Σ11 (χ) is decreasing and convex in the number of observed signals n˜χ, there exists a unique optimal
precision level φ∗
(
Σ¯
)
that minimizes
[
1− r + rΣ¯11 (µ)
]−2
(1 + φ∗)−1 − C (φ∗), for any Σ¯ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus for any
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aggregate information choice distribution µ, and resulting Σ¯11 (µ), the agent’s optimal information choice is almost
everywhere unique, and is no more than δ away from φ∗
(
Σ¯11 (µ)
)
. In the limit as δ → 0, the agent’s best response
profile is therefore characterized by φ∗
(
Σ¯11 (µ)
)
, which rules out the possibility of mixed strategies being optimal in
the limit.
A.6 Proof of Lemma 2: Equilibrium price in the planning model
Conjecture that p (t) takes the form p (t) = σ
∫ t
−∞ gt (τ) dZ (τ) for some function gt (τ). Then, p
∗ (t) = σ·∫ t
−∞ (1− r + rgt (τ)) dZ (τ) and E (p∗ (t) |Iτˆ ) = σ
∫ τˆ
−∞ (1− r + rgt (τ)) dZ (τ). Since p (t) =
∫ t
−∞E (p
∗ (t) |Iτˆ ) dΛt (τˆ),
p (t) = σ
∫ t
−∞
∫ τˆ
−∞
(1− r + rgt (τ)) dZ (τ) dΛt (τˆ)
= σ Λt (τˆ)
∫ τˆ
−∞
(1− r + rgt (τ)) dZ (τ)
∣∣∣∣t
τˆ=−∞
− σ
∫ t
−∞
Λt (τˆ) (1− r + rgt (τˆ)) dZ (τˆ)
= σ
∫ t
−∞
(1− Λt (τ)) (1− r + rgt (τ)) dZ (τ)
where the last step follows from changing the order of integration. Setting gt (τ) = (1−Λt (τ)) (1− r + rgt (τ)) yields
the result. 2
A.7 Proof of Proposition 3: Staggered planning equilibria
Suppose that all other firms plan every T periods, and the proportion of firms planning over any interval of length
dt is T−1dt. Clearly, {Λt (τ)} and L (t, τˆ) only depend on the time δ = t − τˆ since the last planning date, and are
stationary over time w.r.t. δ. Using δ as a state variable, the Bellman equation can now be rewritten as
L (δ) = min
δˆ≥δ
{∫ δˆ−δ
0
e−ρδ
′
L
(
δ′
)
dδ′ + e−ρ(δˆ−δ) [C + L (0)]
}
where the loss function is
L (δ) =

σ2
∫ δ
0
(1−r)2(
1−r δ′
T
)2 dδ′ if δ ≤ T
σ2
∫ T
0
(1−r)2(
1−r δ′
T
)2 dδ′ + σ2 (δ − T ) if δ > T
The solution to this Bellman equation is characterized by an optimal horizon T ∗, s.t. it is optimal to plan at
date t, if and only if t ≥ s + T ∗. T ∗ solves the first-order condition L (T ∗) = ρ [C + L (0)], where L (0) =(∫ T∗
0
e−ρδL (δ) dδ + e−ρT
∗
C
)
/(1− e−ρT∗). In equilibrium, T ∗ = T , so T ∗ has to satisfy
L (T ∗) =
ρ
1− e−ρT∗
[∫ T∗
0
e−ρδL (δ) dδ + C
]
or C =
∫ T∗
0
e−ρδ [L (T ∗)− L (δ)] dδ. Changing variables to θ = δ
T∗ , we write L (δ) as
L (δ) = σ2T ∗
∫ δ/T∗
0
(1− r)2
(1− rθ)2 dθ = σ
2T ∗
(1− r)2
r
(
1
1− rδ/T ∗ − 1
)
= σ2 (1− r)2 T ∗ δ
T ∗ − rδ ,
with L (T ∗) = (1− r)T ∗. Substituting into the equilibrium condition, we have L (T ∗)− L (δ)
= (1− r)T ∗ (T ∗ − δ) / (T ∗ − rδ), and therefore
C = σ2 (1− r)T ∗
∫ T∗
0
e−ρδ
T ∗ − δ
T ∗ − rδ dδ,
The right side of this expression is increasing in T ∗, because r < 1. Thus, there exists a unique solution to this
equilibrium condition, which is increasing in C. With a change of variables, we can rewrite this equation as
C = σ2 (1− r) (T ∗)2
∫ 1
0
e−ρT
∗θ 1− θ
1− rθ dθ.
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This formulation reveals that the equilibrium planning horizon T is increasing in r and ρ because e−ρτ T−τ
T−rτ (1− r) is
decreasing in r and in ρ for all τ ∈ (0, T ). Taking the limit as ρ→ 0, the last expression converges to σ2 (T ∗)2 g (r),
with
g (r) =
∫ 1
0
(1− θ) (1− r)
1− rθ dθ =
1− r
r
{
1 +
1− r
r
log (1− r)
}
.
2
A.8 Proof of Proposition 4: Existence of synchronized planning equilibrium
For arbitrary T > 0 let T ∗ = {nT}n∈N denote the conjectured equilibrium strategy, for a synchronized planning
equilibrium with horizon T . We begin by defining the expected loss L (T ) that is associated with an arbitrary
sequence of planning dates, T = {τˆn}n∈N, when all other firms use strategy T ∗. T ∗ constitutes a synchronized
planning equilibrium, if and only if ∆ (T ) ≡ L (T )− L (T ∗) ≥ 0, for all sequences T .
Under T ∗, the instantaneous loss function at date t is L∗ (t) = (1− r)2 σ2 (t− Tint (t/T )), where int (x) denotes
the integer part of a real number x. Subtracting it from L (t, τˆ), we have
L (t, τˆ)− L∗ (t) =
{
(1− r)2 σ2 (Tint (t/T )− τˆ) if τˆ ≥ T int (t/T )
σ2 (Tint (t/T )− τˆ) if τˆ < T int (t/T ) .
We can rewrite L (t, τˆ)− L∗ (t) in two different ways, that will be useful below:
L (t, τˆ)− L∗ (t) = (1− r)2 σ2 (Tint (t/T )− τˆ) + σ2 (1− (1− r)2)max {0, T int (t/T )− τˆ}
or L (t, τˆ)− L∗ (t) = σ2 (Tint (t/T )− τˆ)− σ2 (1− (1− r)2)min {0, T int (t/T )− τˆ}
= σ2 (Tint (t/T )− τˆ) + σ2 (1− (1− r)2)max {0, τˆ − Tint (t/T )}
A convex combination of the above expressions, for any λ ∈ [0, 1], gives
L (t, τˆ)− L∗ (t) = σ2 [λ (1− r)2 + 1− λ] (T int (t/T )− τˆ)
+σ2
(
1− (1− r)2) [λmax {0, T int (t/T )− τˆ}+ (1− λ)max {0, τˆ − Tint (t/T )}]
Now, ∆ (T ) is given by:
∆ (T ) = σ2
∞∑
n=0
∫ τˆn+1
τˆn
e−ρt
[
λ (1− r)2 + 1− λ] (Tint (t/T )− τˆn) dt+ ∞∑
n=0
(
e−ρτˆn − e−ρnT
)
C
+σ2
(
1− (1− r)2) ∞∑
n=0
∫ τˆn+1
τˆn
e−ρt [λmax {0, T int (t/T )− τˆn}+ (1− λ)max {0, τˆn − Tint (t/T )}] dt
where τˆ0 = 0. Solving the integral terms in the first line gives
∞∑
n=0
∫ τˆn+1
τˆn
e−ρtT int (t/T ) dt =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtTint (t/T ) dt =
∞∑
n=0
nTe−ρnT
∫ T
0
e−ρtdt =
1
ρ
T
e−ρT
1− e−ρT
∞∑
n=0
∫ τˆn+1
τˆn
e−ρtτˆndt =
1
ρ
∞∑
n=0
τˆn
[
e−ρτˆn − e−ρτˆn+1
]
=
1
ρ
∞∑
n=1
e−ρτˆn (τˆn − τˆn−1)
∞∑
n=0
e−ρnTC =
1
1− e−ρT C
and therefore, ∆ (T ) can be rewritten as
∆ (T ) = 1
ρ
e−ρT
1− e−ρT
{
σ2
[
1− λ+ λ (1− r)2]T − ρC}− 1
ρ
∞∑
n=1
e−ρτˆn
{
σ2
[
1− λ+ λ (1− r)2] (τˆn − τˆn−1)− ρC}
+σ2
(
1− (1− r)2) ∞∑
n=0
∫ τˆn+1
τˆn
e−ρt [λmax {0, T int (t/T )− τˆn}+ (1− λ)max {0, τˆn − Tint (t/T )}] dt
Case (i) (r ∈ (0, 1)): For all λ ∈ [0, 1], the second line of this expression is non-negative, and it is zero if and
only if T = T ∗ Therefore, if, for some λ ∈ [0, 1], T ∗ also minimizes the first line of this expression, it must be the
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case that ∆ (T ) is minimized at T ∗, and hence that T ∗ constitutes an equilibrium. Taking first-order conditions, the
first line is minimized, if and only if ρC =
[
1− λ+ λ (1− r)2] (τˆn − τˆn−1 − 1ρ (1− e−ρ(τˆn+1−τˆn))), and T ∗ satisfies
these first order conditions, if and only if
ρC = σ2
[
1− λ+ λ (1− r)2](T − 1
ρ
(
1− e−ρT
))
.
Moreover, we have
T−1
ρ
(
1− e−ρT
)
=
∫ T
0
[
1− e−ρt] dt = [1− e−ρT ]T−ρ ∫ T
0
e−ρttdt = ρ
∫ T
0
e−ρt (T − t) dt = ρT 2
∫ 1
0
e−ρTθ (1− θ) dθ.
Therefore, the first-order condition is satisfied for T at λ = 0, for T¯ at λ = 1, and for every T ∈ [T , T¯ ] at some
intermediary λ ∈ [0, 1]. We conclude that any T ∈ [T , T¯ ] is sustainable as a synchronized equilibrium planning
horizon.
Case (ii) (r = 0): the second line in our expression for ∆ (T ) above is exactly equal to zero, so minimizing the
first line is also a necessary condition for T ∗ to be an equilibrium. Moreover, in this case, we have T = T¯ = T ∗,
so there exists a unique synchronized equilibrium. Moreover, notice that the horizon in this case is identical to the
staggered planning equilibrium. Since there is no interaction in pricing and planning decisions, the distribution of
planning choices is indeterminate in equilibrium.
Case (iii) (r < 0): now, the second line in the expression for ∆ (T ) is negative, and is zero only if T = T ∗.
Consider then a firm that sets τˆ1 = T + δ (for small δ > 0), but keeps all other planning dates unchanged from T ∗,
setting τˆn = nT . The resulting change in expected loss is:
∆+ =
1
ρ
e−ρT
{[
1− e−ρδ
] (
σ2T − ρC)− (1− r)2 σ2δ [e−ρδ − e−ρT ]}
with limit lim
δ→0
(∆+/δ) = e
−ρT
{
σ2T − ρC − (1− r)2 σ2 1
ρ
[
1− e−ρT
]}
If instead, the firm sets τˆ1 = T − δ for small δ, but keeps all other planning dates unchanged, the resulting change in
expected loss is
∆− =
1
ρ
e−ρT
{
σ2δ
[
1− e−ρT
]
−
[
eρδ − 1
] (
(1− r)2 σ2 (T − δ)− ρC)}
with limit lim
δ→0
(∆−/δ) = e
−ρT
{
σ2
1
ρ
[
1− e−ρT
]
− ((1− r)2 σ2T − ρC)}
T ∗ can be an equilibrium only if limδ→0 (∆+/δ) ≥ 0 and limδ→0 (∆−/δ) ≥ 0, but the above immediately implies that
lim
δ→0
(∆+/δ) + lim
δ→0
(∆−/δ) = e
−ρT
{
σ2T − ρC − (1− r)2 σ2 1
ρ
[
1− e−ρT
]}
+e−ρT
{
σ2
1
ρ
[
1− e−ρT
]
− ((1− r)2 σ2T − ρC)}
= e−ρTσ2
(
1− (1− r)2){T + 1
ρ
[
1− e−ρT
]}
< 0,
implying that either limδ→0 (∆+/δ) < 0 or limδ→0 (∆−/δ) < 0, and contradicting the possibility of a synchronized
equilibrium. 2
A.9 Necessary conditions for synchronized planning
Here, we construct bounds T and T , such that a synchronized planning equilibrium only exists for planning horizons
T ∈
[
T , T
]
. Using the numerical procedure discussed in the main text, we check that these conditions are also
sufficient.
Suppose that all other firms plan at dates {T, 2T, ...}. We construct these bounds by showing that whenever
T /∈
[
T , T
]
, the agent prefers to deviate from the proposed sequence of planning dates {T, 2T, ...}, in one of four
ways: (i) adding some additional planning date T ′ to the sequence, (ii) skipping a planning date nT for some n,
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(iii) delaying a planning date from nT to nT + ∆ (where ∆ is infinitesimal), and (iv) moving forward a planning
date from nT to nT −∆ (where ∆ is again infinitesimal). We now provide conditions on T under which these four
deviations are not desirable.
(i) adding a planning date T ′, between between T and 2T : This deviation reduces expected flow losses by
(1− r)2 σ2 (T ′ − T ) between dates T ′ and 2T , but incurs an additional planning cost at date T ′. Combining these
terms, the deviation is not profitable, whenever C ≥ (1− r)2 σ2 ∫ 2T
T ′ (T
′ − T ) e−ρ(t−T ′)dt. Since this must hold for
every T ′ ∈ [T, 2T ], the condition can be rewritten as C ≥ (1− r)2 σ2minx∈[0,T ] x
∫ T
x
e−ρ(t−x)dt
= (1− r)2 σ2minx∈[0,T ] x
(
1− e−ρ(T−x)
)
/ρ.
(ii) skipping a planning date nT : This deviation saves the planning cost C at date nT , but increases the
expected losses by σ2T from nT to (n+ 1)T , so the deviation is not profitable, whenever C ≤ σ2T ∫ T
0
e−ρtdt =
σ2T
(
1− e−ρT ) /ρ.
Combining these two conditions, we have
(1− r)2 σ2 min
x∈[0,T ]
x
1− e−ρ(T−x)
ρ
≤ C ≤ σ2T 1− e
−ρT
ρ
,
which implicitly defines T
1
and T 1. As ρ → 0, this condition converges to (1− r)2 σ2T 2/4 ≤ C ≤ σ2T 2, or
T
1
=
√
C/σ, and T 1 = 2/ (1− r) ·
√
C/σ. Clearly, this spans the set
[
T , T
]
.
In addition, we check that no infinitesimal deviation from the proposed planning dates can be optimal.
(iii) delaying a planning date from nT to nT + ∆: This deviation postpones the planning cost, and reduces
expected losses between nT + ∆ and (n+ 1)T by (1− r)2∆σ2, but it increases expected losses between nT and
nT +∆ by Tσ2. Combining these terms, the deviation is not profitable, whenever
C
[
1− e−ρ∆
]
+∆(1− r)2 σ2
∫ T
∆
e−ρtdt ≤ Tσ2
∫ ∆
0
e−ρtdt
Letting ∆→ 0, the condition becomes ρC ≤ σ2 (T − (1− r)2 (1− e−ρT ) /ρ), which defines an additional lower bound
T
2
.
(iv) advancing a planning date from nT to nT − ∆: This deviation advances the planning cost by ∆, and
increases expected losses between nT and T + 1 by ∆σ2, but lowers expected losses between nT and nT − ∆ by
(1− r)2 (T −∆)σ2. Combining these terms, the deviation is not profitable, whenever
C
[
eρ∆ − 1
]
+∆σ2
∫ T
0
e−ρtdt ≥ (1− r)2 (T −∆)σ2
∫ ∆
0
eρtdt.
Letting ∆ → 0, the condition becomes ρC ≥ σ2
(
(1− r)2 T − 1
ρ
[
1− e−ρT ]), which defines an additional upper
bound T 2.
A synchronized planning equilibrium therefore only exists for T ∈
[
T , T
]
, where T = max
{
T
1
, T
2
}
and T =
min
{
T 1, T 2
}
. As ρ→ 0, T
2
→ 0 and T 2 →∞, so the first set of bounds becomes the relevant one.
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